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THE COURT AFFECTS 
EACH OF US 
THE SUPREME COURT TERM IN REVIEW 
Erwin Chemerinsky† 
BOVE ALL, OCTOBER TERM 2012 powerfully shows that 
Supreme Court decisions affect each of us, often in the 
most important and intimate aspects of our lives. On 
Wednesday, June 26, the Supreme Court dismissed on 
jurisdictional grounds the case involving California’s Proposition 8 
and two days later same sex couples began marrying in California.1 
The decisions of this term will affect who gets into college, when 
the government can take our DNA, what federal benefits married 
same-sex couples can receive, what voting systems are used and thus 
who gets elected, and whether injured individuals can successfully 
sue businesses. 
Once more, it was the Anthony Kennedy Court. Justice Kennedy 
was in the majority more than any other justice: 91% of the time.2 
But it is the 5-4 decisions where Kennedy’s influence is best seen. 
Out of 73 cases decided after briefing and oral argument, 23 were 
5-4. Kennedy was in the majority in 20 of the 23. Antonin Scalia 
was second most often in the majority in 5-4 cases, but in only 13 of 
them.  
                                                                                                 
† Erwin Chemerinsky is Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law and Raymond Pryke Profes-
sor of First Amendment Law at the University of California, Irvine School of Law. 
1 Perry v. Hollingsworth, 133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013). 
2 All of the statistics are from the “Statpack” on www.scotusblog.com. 
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It therefore is possible to get the clearest overall sense of the 
ideology of the term by focusing on the 16 cases that were ideologi-
cally divided 5-4 along familiar lines, with John Roberts, Scalia, 
Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito on one side and Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan on 
the other. Kennedy was with the conservatives in ten and with the 
liberals in six of these cases. 
So what were some of the more important cases of the term and 
what will they mean?3  
I. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
o decision was more eagerly anticipated than Fisher v. University 
of Texas on the constitutionality of affirmative action by colleg-
es and universities.4 The case was argued on Wednesday, October 
10, but not decided until Monday, June 24. At first reading, the 
decision seemed to do very little. Supporters of affirmative action 
breathed a huge sigh of relief that the Court did not change the law, 
at most clarified it, and remanded the case for further consideration.  
In June 2003, in Grutter v. Bollinger,5 the Supreme Court held 5-4 
that colleges and universities have a compelling interest in having a 
                                                                                                 
3 Of course, a 5,000-word essay can cover only some of the cases of the term. 
Other important cases not discussed here included: Alleyne v. United States, 133 
S.Ct. 2151 (2013) (the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury requires a jury to 
determine facts that increase a mandatory minimum sentence); Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S.Ct. 2107 (2013) (naturally oc-
curring DNA segment is a product of nature and not patent-eligible merely be-
cause it has been isolated, but complementary DNA (cDNA) is patent-eligible 
because it is not naturally occurring); Clapper v. Amnesty International, 133 
S.Ct. 1138 (2013) (challenge to possible electronic surveillance of those in the 
United States under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act dismissed for lack of 
standing because plaintiffs could not show that their conversations were inter-
cepted or likely to be intercepted); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management 
District, 133 S.Ct. 2586 (2013) (the government’s demand for property from a 
land-use permit applicant must satisfy the Nollan/Dolan requirements even when 
it denies the permit).  
4 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013).  
5 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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diverse student body and that they may use race as one factor among 
many in their admissions decisions. In 2004, the Regents of the Uni-
versity of Texas realized that they had a less diverse student body 
than existed in 1996. A new admissions plan was adopted.  
Under it, about 75 percent of the entering class was taken from 
the top ten percent of high schools across the state. Texas is suffi-
ciently racially segregated that this will produce some racial diversi-
ty. The other 25 percent of the class was taken by calculating an 
admissions score for each student. The score was the sum of two 
numbers: an academic achievement index, which was the applicant’s 
grades and test scores, and a personal achievement index, which was 
arrived at by grading two essays and looking at six factors, one of 
which was diversity. 
Abigail Fisher applied for the University of Texas in 2008 and 
was rejected. She enrolled at Louisiana State University, from which 
she graduated in 2012. After being rejected, she brought a lawsuit 
against the University of Texas challenging its use of race as denying 
equal protection. The federal district court and the Fifth Circuit 
ruled in favor of the University of Texas, saying that it had followed 
Grutter and had permissibly used race as one factor among many in 
its admissions decisions. 
The Supreme Court granted review. I strongly believe that the 
Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. Fisher expressly 
acknowledged to the Court that she no longer has claims for injunc-
tive or declaratory relief. She graduated from college and is not go-
ing again. She is the only plaintiff in the lawsuit and her only re-
maining claim is for $100, her application fee. The defendants in the 
lawsuit are the University of Texas and its regents, sued in their of-
ficial capacity. But the law is clear that the Eleventh Amendment 
bars suits for money damages against a state or its officials in their 
official capacity.6 Moreover, to have standing a plaintiff must show 
that his or her injury is caused by the unconstitutional policy.7 Fish-
er’s loss of $100 was not caused by the affirmative action plan. 
                                                                                                 
6 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction (6th ed. 2012) 438. 
7 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
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Inexplicably, the Court ignored these jurisdictional issues (they 
were raised in a footnote in the University of Texas’s brief).8 In a 7-
1 decision, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s decision and re-
manded the case for reconsideration. Justice Kennedy wrote for the 
Court. Only Justice Ginsburg dissented. Justice Kagan was recused. 
Kennedy wrote that the Court was not reconsidering Grutter and 
its holding that colleges and universities have a compelling interest 
in having a diverse student body. The Court said, though, that Grut-
ter established that any use of race in admissions must meet strict 
scrutiny and thus must be shown to be necessary to achieve a com-
pelling interest. The Court said that it is not enough to have a com-
pelling interest in achieving diversity; a college or university also 
must show that the use of race is necessary to achieve it. 
Kennedy wrote that there must be a “careful judicial inquiry into 
whether a university could achieve sufficient diversity without using 
racial classifications.”9 In crucial language, he said: “The reviewing 
Court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral 
alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity. If a 
nonracial approach . . . could promote the substantial interest about 
as well and at tolerable administrative expense, then the university 
may not consider race.” But the Court also said that this “does not 
require exhaustion of every conceivable race neutral alternative.”10 
In one sense, this did not change the law concerning affirmative 
action. The Court reaffirmed Grutter: colleges and universities have 
a compelling interest in having a diverse student body, but must 
meet strict scrutiny in using race as a factor in admissions decisions.  
In another sense, though, Fisher adopts a tougher, less sympathet-
ic tone when it comes to affirmative action programs. For example, 
in Grutter, the Court spoke of the need to defer to the judgment of 
colleges and universities. In Fisher, the Court said that such defer-
ence was appropriate only as to the importance of diversity; there is 
no deference to given as to whether race is necessary to achieve it. 
                                                                                                 
8 Brief for Respondents, Fisher v. University of Texas, Austin, at 16-17 (fn. 6). 
9 133 S.Ct. at 2420. 
10 Id.  
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Kennedy declared: “The University must prove that the means cho-
sen by the University to attain diversity are narrowly tailored to that 
goal. On this point, the University receives no deference.”11 
Fisher leaves open many crucial questions, which will need to be 
litigated on remand (unless the lower court dismisses, as it should, 
for lack of jurisdiction) and in challenges to other affirmative action 
plans. Colleges and universities use race to gain diversity precisely 
because other alternatives don’t achieve racial diversity.  
But what kind of evidence is required to show that race neutral 
alternatives are insufficient to achieve diversity? Must each institu-
tion compile its own evidence and how much evidence is required? 
In fact, it even is unclear as to what qualifies as a “race neutral” 
alternative. For example, is a top ten percent plan – a state universi-
ty taking the top ten percent of graduates from around the state – 
race neutral? Ginsburg makes the point in her dissent that top ten 
percent plans are adopted with the intent of creating racial diversity 
and have that effect.12 A government action taken with the intent 
and impact of using race is treated as a racial classification under 
equal protection. In fact, any proxy for race that is done with the 
purpose and effect of using race is a racial classification. 
Nor does the Court offer any guidance about what “diversity” 
means. In Grutter, the Court recognized that there must be a “critical 
mass” of minority students to attract them to attend and to provide 
the benefits of diversity. One of the key issues raised in the briefs 
and oral arguments in Fisher was how to determine what is sufficient 
for a “critical mass.” The Court did not address that issue. 
II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
A. Fourth Amendment 
his was a big year for the Fourth Amendment in the Supreme 
Court, with five decisions.13 Two – Florida v. Jardines14 and Mary-
                                                                                                 
11 Id.  
12 Id. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
13 The other Fourth Amendment cases were: Florida v. Harris, 133 S.Ct. 1050 
T 
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land v. King15 – are especially important for what they say about the 
Court’s approach to the Fourth Amendment. In the former, the 
Court ruled that it is a search under the Fourth Amendment for a 
police officer to take a drug-sniffing dog onto the front porch of a 
home without the consent of the homeowner. Justice Scalia, writing 
for the majority in a 5-4 decision, held that taking the dog onto the 
property was a trespass and that was sufficient for it to be a search.  
In Maryland v. King, the Court held, 5-4 with Justice Kennedy 
writing for the majority, that it did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment for the police to routinely take DNA from those arrested for 
serious crimes, if the DNA is taken for the purpose of helping to 
solve other crimes for which the individual is not a suspect. The 
Court, stressing that the police action was reasonable because the 
benefits to law enforcement outweighed the invasion of privacy, 
likened this to taking fingerprints from those arrested. 
Beyond limiting dog sniffs at homes and approving taking DNA 
from arrestees, these cases show the failure of the Court to deal 
with a crucial underlying issue: when should the police be able to 
gather information about an individual, whether it is about what is 
going on in the home or from the person’s DNA, without a warrant 
and probable cause? Informational privacy is the key question in a 
society where it is increasingly easy for police to gather information 
about people and their activities. Neither case focused on this.16 
 
                                                                                                 
(2013) (use of a police dog to establish probable cause does not required detailed 
evidence establishing its reliability); Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013) 
(there are not inherently exigent circumstances justifying warrantless taking of 
blood without consent in all driving-under-the-influence cases); United States v. 
Bailey, 133 S.Ct. 1031 (2013) (police cannot detain an individual who is not at 
home incident to a search of the home). 
14 133 S.Ct. 1409 (2013). 
15 133 S.Ct. 1958 (2013). 
16 In a concurring opinion in Jardines, Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg and 
Sotomayor, urged a privacy based approach, rather than one focusing on property 
and trespass. 133 S.Ct. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
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B. Fifth Amendment 
person cannot invoke the right to remain silent by being silent 
and not responding to police questions. That seemingly oxy-
moronic statement was the holding in Salinas v. Texas.17 The result is 
that unless a person explicitly invokes the right to remain silent in 
the face of police questioning before an arrest, prosecutors can use 
that silence as evidence of guilt at trial. The bottom line is that crim-
inal defense lawyers should advise their clients to be explicit that 
they are invoking their right to remain silent whenever they wish to 
refuse to answer police questions. 
Genovevo Salinas was questioned by the police in connection 
with a double murder. He was not under arrest and voluntarily an-
swered questions from the police. He had turned over his shotgun 
and for most of the hour-long interview with the police officers re-
sponded to their questions, but when asked whether his shotgun 
“would match the shells recovered at the scene of the murder,” Sa-
linas declined to answer. 
When Salinas was prosecuted for the murders, the prosecutor 
used evidence of his silence in response to the police questions as 
evidence of his guilt. He was convicted and sentenced to 20 years in 
prison. 
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, without a majority opin-
ion, held that there had not been a violation of Salinas’s privilege 
against self-incrimination. Justice Alito wrote the plurality opinion, 
which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy. The 
plurality said that the privilege against self-incrimination must be 
expressly invoked and Salinas never did that.  
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice 
Scalia, and would have gone much further: he would have overruled 
the long-standing Supreme Court decision which held that prosecu-
tors cannot use a defendant’s silence as evidence of guilt. In Griffin v. 
California,18 the Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
                                                                                                 
17 133 S.Ct. 2174 (2013). 
18 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
A 
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against self-incrimination prohibits a prosecutor or judge from nega-
tively commenting on a defendant’s failure to testify. 
Justice Breyer wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. He stressed that the Court long 
has held that “no ritualistic formula is necessary in order to invoke 
the privilege,”19 and that in the context of the questioning of Salinas, 
his silence was likely intended to avoid answering questions that 
might incriminate him. Although not under arrest, he was ques-
tioned at the police station and was told that he was a suspect in the 
murders. Breyer said that the issue in any case should be “whether 
one can fairly infer that the individual being questioned is invoking 
the Amendment’s protection.”20 
The case is troubling because it is so divorced from reality. Most 
people don’t know that they have the right to remain silent when 
questioned by police during an investigation. And certainly most are 
unlikely to know that even if they have such a right, they must ex-
plicitly say, “I wish to invoke my right to remain silent.” Although 
the plurality does not specify any magic words that must be uttered, 
it seems fairly close to that because the suspect must unambiguously 
and expressly invoke the right to remain silent. 
There is a profound irony to the plurality’s approach: exercising 
the right to remain silent by being silent is not sufficient to invoke 
that right. A defendant must speak in order to claim that right and 
likely must do so with exactly the type of “ritualistic formula” that 
the Court has previously rejected. Constitutional protections should 
not be just for those who have legal training and know what they 
need to say to the police to invoke their rights.  
III. VOTING RIGHTS 
he Voting Rights Act of 1965 is one of the most important fed-
eral laws adopted in my lifetime. Section 2 prohibits state and 
local governments from having election practices or systems that 
discriminate against minority voters. Lawsuits can be brought to 
                                                                                                 
19 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955). 
20 133 S.Ct. at 2189 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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enforce it. But Congress believed that this was not sufficient to stop 
discrimination in voting. Congress knew that litigation is expensive 
and time consuming. Congress also knew that some states – espe-
cially Southern states – had the practice of continually changing 
their voting systems to disenfranchise minority voters. 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act provides that jurisdictions 
with a history of race discrimination in voting may change their 
election systems only if they get “preclearance” from the Attorney 
General or a three-judge federal district court. Section 4(b) of the 
Act defines those jurisdictions which must get preclearance: nine 
states and many local governments with a history of race discrimina-
tion in voting. 
Each time the law was about to expire, Congress extended it. 
Most recently, the law was set to expire in 2007 and Congress held 
12 hearings over an 11-month period and produced a record of 
15,000 pages. The Senate voted 98-0 to extend the law for another 
25 years and there were only 33 no votes in the House of Represent-
atives. President George W. Bush signed the extension into law. 
In Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, the Court, 5-4, held Section 
4(b) unconstitutional and thereby also effectively nullified Section 5 
because it applies only to jurisdictions covered under Section 4(b).21 
It is the first time since the 19th century that the Court has declared 
unconstitutional a federal civil rights statute. Chief Justice Roberts 
wrote for the Court and stressed that the formula in Section 4(b) 
rests on data from the 1960s and the 1970s. He said that it was an 
intrusion on state and local sovereignty to require that they “be-
seech” the Attorney General to approve their election systems. 
Roberts said that it violated a principle of equal state sovereignty to 
treat the states differently with regard to the requirement for pre-
clearance. 
Roberts’s opinion was puzzling because the constitutional basis 
for the decision was not clear. What part of the Constitution did 
Section 4(b) violate? What level of scrutiny was the Court using? 
What is the constitutional basis for the principle of equal sovereign-
                                                                                                 
21 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013). 
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ty? None of these questions was addressed by the Court. 
In theory, Congress can enact a new version of Section 4(b) 
based on contemporary data. In reality, it is hard to imagine Con-
gress being able to ever agree on a new formula to require that 
some of jurisdictions and not others get preclearance. Moreover, it 
would seem that any formula which treats some states differently 
from others would violate the Court’s principle of equal state sov-
ereignty. The effect likely will be a significant increase in litigation 
under Section 2 and also many election systems going into place that 
otherwise would have been rejected because of their impact on mi-
nority voters. 
IV. MARRIAGE EQUALITY 
n two decisions on Wednesday, June 26, the Supreme Court sig-
nificantly expanded the right to marriage equality for gays and 
lesbians. In United States v. Windsor,22 the Court invalidated Section 3 
of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which provided that for 
purposes of federal law, marriage had to be between a man and a 
woman. The result is that same-sex couples who are lawfully married 
in the 13 states which now allow this will receive benefits that are 
accorded to married couples under more than 1,000 federal laws. 
In Hollingsworth v. Perry,23 the Court dismissed the litigation con-
cerning California’s Proposition 8, which had amended the State’s 
constitution to provide that marriage must be between a man and a 
woman.  
Although the Court’s decisions were limited to those laws, the 
implications are enormous. Simply put, the Court took a major step 
towards a right to marriage equality for gays and lesbians in the 
United States. 
In Windsor, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, declared Sec-
tion 3 of DOMA unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy wrote for the 
Court and his opinion was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, So-
tomayor, and Kagan. Kennedy began by addressing the issue of ju-
                                                                                                 
22 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013). 
23 133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013). 
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risdiction. Since the Obama administration agreed with the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that Section 3 of DOMA is 
unconstitutional, could it seek Supreme Court review? The Court 
found that there was jurisdiction because there was a continuing 
dispute between the United States and Edith Windsor over whether 
she was owed a refund of the $363,053 in estate taxes she had paid 
on her inheritance from her deceased partner. The Court conclud-
ed: “Windsor’s ongoing claim for funds that the United States refus-
es to pay thus establishes a controversy sufficient for Article III ju-
risdiction.”24 The Court found that the “sharp adversarial presenta-
tion of the issues” by the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) 
of the House of Representatives “satisfies the prudential concerns 
that otherwise might counsel against hearing an appeal from a deci-
sion with which the principal parties agree.”25 
The Court then reached the merits and found that Section 3 of 
DOMA denies equal protection to gays and lesbians. The Court be-
gan by noting that marriage has traditionally been defined by the 
states. The Court said that “DOMA seeks to injure the very class 
New York seeks to protect. By doing so it violates basic due process 
and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Govern-
ment.”26 The Court explained that DOMA is unconstitutional be-
cause it was based on an impermissible desire to disadvantage gays 
and lesbians. Kennedy quoted the House Report on DOMA, which 
said the Act was based on “both moral disapproval of homosexuality, 
and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with 
traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality.”27 
The Supreme Court earlier held that the government cannot 
base a law on disapproval of homosexuality.28 Such animus is not a 
legitimate government purpose sufficient to justify a discriminatory 
statute. 
                                                                                                 
24 133 S.Ct. at 2686. 
25 Id. at 2688. 
26 Id. at 2693. 
27 Id. at 2693. 
28 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito each wrote a 
dissenting opinion. The dissents argued that the Court should have 
dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds and strongly disagreed 
with the Court’s invalidation of Section 3 of DOMA. Each urged 
deference to Congress’s judgment to prohibit same sex marriage. 
The irony is that none of these justices felt any need to defer to 
Congress when striking down a key provision of the Voting Rights 
Act in Shelby County. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry involved a California initiative which 
banned same-sex marriages. In May 2008, the California Supreme 
Court interpreted the California Constitution to create a right of 
marriage equality for gays and lesbians. To overturn this decision, in 
November 2008, California voters passed Proposition 8, which 
amended the California Constitution to say that marriage had to be 
between a man and a woman.  
Two same-sex couples seeking marriage licenses brought a law-
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 8. In the 
summer of 2010, federal district court Judge Vaughn Walker de-
clared Proposition 8 unconstitutional because it violated the funda-
mental right to marry and denied equal protection to gays and lesbi-
ans. The defendants in the lawsuit, including the Governor, the At-
torney General, and the Registrar of Records, decided not to appeal 
Walker’s ruling. Supporters of Proposition 8 intervened to appeal. 
After briefing and oral argument, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit certified to the California Supreme Court the 
question of whether under California law the supporters of an initia-
tive have standing to appeal when state officials refuse to do so. The 
California Supreme Court said that the supporters of an initiative 
could represent the interests of the state to ensure that an initiative 
is defended in court.29 The Ninth Circuit, in February 2012, then 
found that the supporters of the initiative had standing to appeal and 
declared Proposition 8 unconstitutional.  
 
                                                                                                 
29 Perry v. Brown, 52 Cal.4th 1116, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 499, 265 P.3d 1002 (2011). 
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The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed and vacated the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court 
that the supporters of an initiative lack standing to appeal to defend 
it when government officials refuse to do so. His opinion was joined 
by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. The Court ex-
plained that standing to bring a suit or appeal requires that there be 
an injury. Those who support an initiative suffer only an ideological 
injury if it is enjoined and an ideological injury is never sufficient for 
standing. The result is that the federal district court decision invali-
dating Proposition 8 stands. 
In practical effect, these decisions are very important. Gay and 
lesbian couples who are married will get federal benefits previously 
reserved for heterosexual couples. Gay and lesbian couples are now 
marrying in California, making it the thirteenth and largest state to 
permit this. 
The Supreme Court was explicit that it was declaring only Sec-
tion 3 of DOMA unconstitutional and not ruling on any other law 
denying marriage equality. But the Court’s reasoning will have sig-
nificant implications for laws denying marriage equality for gays and 
lesbians. For example, Section 2 of DOMA, which says that no state 
must recognize a same-sex marriage from another state, is almost 
surely unconstitutional after the Court’s decision in Windsor. Ken-
nedy said that DOMA is unconstitutional because it was based on 
impermissible hostility to gays and lesbians. This would seem to 
make all of it unconstitutional, including Section 2.  
The next major wave of litigation will be challenges to state laws 
that prohibit same-sex marriage. In his vehement dissent, Scalia said 
that there is no way to distinguish these statutes from Section 3 of 
DOMA and it is just a matter of waiting for the other shoe to drop.  
After Windsor’s conclusion that no legitimate government pur-
pose is served by denying gays and lesbians the right to marry, it is 
difficult to see how the Court will uphold any law prohibiting same-
sex marriage. Those who oppose same-sex marriage will argue that 
the language about federalism in Kennedy’s opinion supports the 
ability of states to decide, including to ban same-sex marriage. But 
the holding in Windsor was that Section 3 of DOMA unconstitution-
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ally denied equal protection to gays and lesbians. Its reasoning, that 
the failure to recognize same-sex marriages is based on animus and 
serves no legitimate purpose, will be the basis for challenging state 
laws throughout the country. It seems only a matter of a short time 
before this gets back to the Supreme Court and it appears that there 
are five votes – Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan 
– to strike down such laws. 
V. BUSINESS LITIGATION 
n a number of important decisions, the Supreme Court ruled in 
favor of businesses and made it more difficult for those injured to 
sue. In Mutual Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Bartlett,30 the Court ruled, 5-4, 
that makers of generic drugs could not be sued for design defects. 
Two years ago, in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,31 the Court ruled that mak-
ers of generic drugs cannot be sued on a failure to warn theory. In 
these two cases, the Court said that under federal law, generic drugs 
can be sold if they are identical to brand-name drugs and if they have 
the warning label approved for the brand-name drugs. The Court 
said this precludes a generic drug company from changing the chem-
ical compound or the warning label, so no lawsuits can be brought 
for failure to do so. 
According to the Food and Drug Administration, almost 80 % of 
all prescriptions are filled with generic drugs. If there is a generic 
equivalent to the brand name drug, over 90% of prescriptions are 
filled with the generic drug. Those injured by generic drugs, even 
severely, likely are without a remedy. 
In two employment discrimination cases, both 5-4, the Court 
made it much more difficult for employees who bring such claims. 
In Vance v. Ball State University,32 the Court made it harder for em-
ployees suing for workplace harassment. In recent years the Court 
has held that an employer can be held liable for harassment by a fel-
low employee only if the employer is proven to be negligent in con-
                                                                                                 
30 133 S.Ct. 2466 (2013). 
31 131 S.Ct. 2567 (2011). 
32 133 S.Ct. 2434 (2013). 
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trolling the workplace.33 If the harasser is a supervisor and the su-
pervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, 
the employer is strictly liable. But if no tangible employment action 
is taken, the employer may escape liability by establishing, as an af-
firmative defense, that (1) the employer exercised reasonable care 
to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and (2) the plaintiff 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective 
opportunities that the employer provided. 
In Vance, the Court adopted a narrow definition of who is a su-
pervisor, limiting it to those employees who have been empowered 
by their employer to take an adverse employment action, such as the 
power to “hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline” the 
employee bringing the harassment claim. This will mean that in 
many more cases an employee can recover for harassment only by 
proving negligence by the employer.  
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,34 the 
Court made it more difficult for employees to successfully sue for 
claims that they were retaliated against for complaining of discrimi-
nation. Generally, a plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit 
need only show that the prohibited grounds, such as race or gender, 
were a motivating factor for the adverse employment action. The 
Court has prescribed a method of analysis for such “mixed motive” 
claims.35 
But in Nassar, the Court ruled that the retaliation provision of Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and similarly worded provi-
sions in other federal statutes, requires a plaintiff to prove that an 
employer would not have taken the adverse employment action but 
for the desire to retaliate. This requirement of “but-for causation” 
likely will mean that many more of such claims will be resolved in 
favor of employers at the summary judgment stage. 
Finally, in American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant,36 a small 
                                                                                                 
33 Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
34 133 S.Ct. 2517 (2013). 
35 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  
36 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013). 
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business sought to bring a class action against American Express for 
alleged antitrust violations. American Express moved to prevent this 
litigation by invoking a clause in its agreement with Italian Colors 
requiring individual, and not class-wide, arbitration. The Court said 
that an arbitration clause in a contract must be enforced even if it 
means that the antitrust suit realistically would not go forward.  
Italian Colors said that the suit simply could not go forward ex-
cept as a class action. Successfully suing for an antitrust violation 
costs hundreds of thousands if not millions of dollars. Recovery for a 
claim under the antitrust law, though, is limited to $39,000. The 
Court, 5-4, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, said that the Federal Ar-
bitration Act required that the arbitration clause be strictly en-
forced, even if it meant that the antitrust claims otherwise would 
not be brought. As in ATT Mobility LLC v. Concepcion two years ago,37 
the Court’s conservative majority required enforcement of an arbi-
tration clause even though it would likely completely immunize the 
defendant from liability for illegal conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
ctober Term 2012 was filled with blockbuster cases and next 
term promises to be more of the same. The Court already has 
cases on the docket concerning abortion rights, affirmative action, 
campaign finance, separation of church and state, separation of 
powers, and freedom of speech. It is an amazing time in the United 
States Supreme Court. 
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